The present paper applies the financial instability hypothesis in order to explain the financial crises of 2008-2010 in eleven emerging Eastern European economies Also, it seeks to map if institutional frameworks of these countries enabled them to stand against the factors leading into the financial crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The international financial crises, which started with significant fall in housing markets during the second half of 2007, hit most Eastern Europeans economies hard from 2008. Conventional visdom among economists to a large degree seems to be that the crises was transmitted from Western Europe to Eastern Europe by international financial markets, causing liquidity crises and thereafter capital crisis, ending up in busts in the real economy (Bracke and Martin, 2012 , Jungmann and Sagemann, 2011 , Åslund, 2018 . In addition fragile institutions in form of political and domestic financial systems seem to have been unable to set up a stronghold against the evolvment of the crisis.
RESEARCH PROBLEM
This paper investigates the financial crisis in 2008-2010 by two approaches. The first takes its departure in the financial instability hypothesis as set up by Minsky (1982: 13-39 ) and Kindleberger (1996) . The hypothsis is also in line with the argument of the two nobel prize winners in economics Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott. On the basis of empirical research on trends and deviations from trends they argue expansion and contraction in money and credit be decisive for busiess cycles (Kydland, 1990: 3-18) .
The second approach is to investigate into institutional stability of economies. In other words: is there a framework present within the economies capable of both preventing and redusing the sclae of financial crises?
To sum up, the research problem of the paper is to find out if a Minsky-Kindleberger approach can throw light on domestic financial instability as a major force for the development of the Eastern Europen branch of the international financial crisis This is seen in light of important institutional development indicators for these economies.
The paper offers an anatomy of the financial crisis in eleven emerging Eastern European economies, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and Ukraine. This is done by following the pattern of central macroeconomic indicators determining over-all production. We seek to find their trend and cycle components by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to map significant shortterm deviations from their long-term equilibriums. Significant positive cycle values might indicate financial overheating, and may have caused busts in the economy, measured by significant cycle downturns.
If one finds that booms and busts, or significant business cycles in the real economy follow the pattern of financial key indicators as money and credit volumes, one may conclude that huge swings in the economies to a large extent can be explained by a Minsky-Kindleberger appraoch to the understanding of the evolvement of financial crises.
OUTLINE
Thus, the outline of the paper in order to solve the research problem would be as follows: It will first discuss the theoretical framework of the Minsky-Kindleberger approach with its emphasize on the financial instability hypothesis to explain the evolvement of financial crises.
Secondly, it will investigate the institutional framework of the eleven mentioned Eastern Economies by looking at institutional development indicators in order to elaborate on their modernization, integration in to the global economy, and by that their ability to tackle situations leading up to financial crises.
Thirdly, if key variables indicating macroeconomic financial instability follows the pattern of the crisis it is likely that it is a result of booms and busts in financial indicators in line with the Minsky-Kindleberger approach. Additionally, the level of institutional development might contribute to understand to what degree these economies were able to handle the situation.
DEFINITIONS
Before we present our theoretical framework it is important to clarify our understanding of financial crises. We refer to financial crises as situations where financial institutions or assets lose significant values and the financial institutions are not able to provide necessary means of payment. Goldsmith, defines financial crises as (Goldsmith 1982 During the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, financial crises were associated with bank panics and credit crunches. The modern understanding of financial crises includes stock market crashes, financial bubbles bursts, currency crises, and sovereign defaults.
Claessens and Kose (2013) highlights that financial crises are typically multidimensional, often associated with one or more of four phenomena: substantial changes in credit volumes and asset prices; severe disruptions in financial intermediation and supply of external financing; large scale balance sheet problems and large scale government support.
Drawing on established definitions, we define financial crises as significant negative development in several financial indicators, causing credit markets to work irrationally by not providing necessary credit to the economy.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Both Minsky and Kindleberger argue that financial crises commonly start with financial instability. ` financial markets in particular the markets for money and credit are exposed to disturbances that might end in lost sustainable equilibriums (Minsky, 1982 and 1986 ). Hence, their approach is often characterized as the instability hypothesis. According to Kindleberger (1996) this might typically happen through significant exogenous macroeconomic shocks, causing the economy to run faster by drawing on an extended volume of credits. Minsky, on the other hand, pays more attention to endogenous system, i.e. shortcomings in order to deal with disturbances in the financial markets. This system error makes financial instability to evolve in times of mismatch between short term and long term sustainable equilibriums.
THEORY
Both agree that positive expectations, after lack of stability has been established, may cause demand for credit to increase. Financial stability is lost, and positive credit bubbles arise. Next, both financial markets and the overall economy become overheated due too high growth of money volumes. When the money surplus is too high, asset bubbles arise. Speculation in continuously growth of asset prices cause bubbles to increase further. The expectation of even higher over pricing of assets make the prices increase even more.
This will go on until markets turn, due to expectations of an obtained price maximum. The turn in financial markets is often called the "Minsky Moment". Thereafter, expected losses make markets fall even steeper and deeper. The economy, and in particular asset markets, will then be faced credit crunches, crashes, and recessions (Kindleberger and Aliber 2015, pp. 33-76). In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we have tried to fomalize the Minsky and Kindleberger models for evolvement of financial crises.
Figure 1. Minsky model for financial crises
This formalized version of Minsky's model of common evolvement of financial crises, go through five phases. The first one, Displacement, is the period of time when markets loose their natural growth pattern due to a positive shift in demand. If one expects this to be of a permanent character, the market moves into its next phase, Overtrading, i.e. too high activity compared to sustainable equilibriums. Overtrading promotes the third phase, Monetary Expansion, due to increase in demand for credits and willingness to grant such. These three first phases come to being due to loss of financial stability. Financial markets are not longer secure due to overexpansion of money and credits.
During these phases Minsky puts emphasis on what is referred to as three-step financial taxonomy. This implies that the mot common way to finance investments during periods of stable financial markets is hedge financing, basically drawing on business surpluses and normal borrowing. In times of rapid expansion and credit growth, speculative finance, drawing on future increase in asset prices, is more common. Finally, Ponzi financing becomes more common, implying that capital emissions are necessary for further growth. Financial security of borrowing money decreases in all these three taxonomy phases.
Monetary expansion brings the markets to a maximum with an over heated economy and asset bubbles. When market expectations turn, markets and asset prices will fall. Hence, one has reached the new phase, Revulsion. Negative expectations and corrections will dominate and a period of crisis will follow, denoted as Discredit.
When Minsky gives an endogenous Keynesian model, Kindleberger offers more of an exogenous neo-classical model, but still substantially inspired by the Minsky model.
Kindleberger starts with a exogenous shock, leading to monetary expansion, which the financial markets are not able to deal with. This leads to the first phase Manias, with over investments in financial markets, implying the creation of euforistic asset bubbles. This is followed by Panic. Both these evolve due to loss of financial stability. During this phase the markets turn into the third phase Crashes, when asset prices fall dramatically and under 
Figure 2. Kindleberger model for financial crises
Kindleberger also puts attention to the impact of hegemonial powers, i.e. actors, whom due to their size, standing and role are able to monitor and influence the market significantly. Thus, they are decisive for financial stability, as well as the development, depth and the way of handling financial crises.
In extensive empirical studies of international financial crises, Tornell and Westermann conclude that the Minsky-Kindleberger approach can be applied for the vast majority of financial crises. They also conclude that financial liberalization tends to cause more or less irregular boom-bust cycles (Tornell and Westermann 2005) . Also, on the basis of empirical research Eichengreen argues that financial instability may cause what he denotes as illusive stability, which is short-term and fragile financial stability mismatching long-term sustainable financial stability (Eichengreen 1990) . A similar type of argument is found with Reinhart and Roghoff (2009) . In 2016 effort was in combining Minsky's model and Kindleberger's theory with international empirical research and ended up with a formal seven phases dynamic model for common patterns on the way to financial crises. (Gtytten and Hunnes, 2016). This model can be described as in Figure 3 . 
METHODOLOGY
In order to map booms and busts of the economy in form of business cycles and financial cycles, the paper seeks to establish measures of these cycles within time series. This is in line with the methodology used in a previous paper by Grytten and Hunnes (Grytten and Hunnes;, 2014: 25-57). To achieve this we use a Hodrick-Prescott-filter. It separates an observed time series (xt) into a trend component (gt) and a cycle component (ct):
To identify the components, the HP-filter minimize the variance of ct subject to a penalty for variation in the second difference of gt:
Here ( − ) denotes the cycle component and [( +1 − ) − ( − −1 )] is the difference in the trend growth rate from period t until t+1, whereas controls the smoothness of the growth component.
This implies that a smoothing parameter equal to zero means that all changes in the observed series should be explained by trend developments. A high smoothing parameter implies that the cycle is an important component in the observed time series.
One can calculate the cycle component by deducting the trend component from the observed time series: High smoothing parameters will give trends with minor fluctuations, and thus, significant cycles, when low smoothing parameters will give trends with large fluctuations, and thus, minor cycles. Rules of thumb suggest a smoothing-parameter with = 100 for annual figures, = 1,600 for quarterly figure, and = 14,400 for monthly figures.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The institutional framework the different economies are working under is imperative for their development and ability to handle crises (Riaz 2009: 26-35) . It decides their level of integration and modernization into a global economy. Thus, it is important to look into such frameworks for the eleven Eastern-European economies under investigation here. This is done by mapping their level of institutional development as a comparative analysis. The following study is based on the analysis of indices of these eleven Eastern European Economies, which until the 1990s had approximately the same economic systems and mechanisms, and, thereafter, began to transform their political and economic systems towards market economies (Harris 1999: 125-158).
DEVELOPMENT OF EASTERN EMERGING ECONOMIES
Reforming the economy on a market-oriented basis has stimulated the emerging economies of Eastern Europe to economic integration -a process that is increasingly global (Moghadam 2014: 8-13) . However, the vectors of integration in different countries are not the same. Some countries, are already part of EU (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania), when most of the post-Soviet republics are still looking for ways of fruitful cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and some other forms of integration. However, almost all countries of this group have strategic integration goals towards the EU.
Many important decisions on strengthening the integration remain on paper only or are being implemented at different paces. There are several reasons for this (Cerqueira 2018: 329-333 ).
In the first place, it is a consequence of the deep decline of the economies of all CIS countries, the breakdown of economic ties between the subjects of the former USSR and the difficulties of the transition to market economy.
Secondly, this situation is also due to political ambitions of party leaders, which is not always for the best of international economic integration.
Thirdly, a shortsighted policy of governments trying to gain benefits for their state at the expense of other CIS members causes delay in the integration and modernization process. Despite multiple declarations on the need to reduce customs barriers, governments operate in the opposite direction: customs posts, quotas, and licensing of mutual trade.
The newly reformed economies have become unstable, dependent on external factors and resource-intensive. At the early stage features of the transition to sustainable development were the following:
REORGANIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
It was assumed that the transfer of enterprises to private ownership would increase their efficiency, production of competitive goods and lead to the entering of international markets. In practice, the market mechanism was weak, the old principles of regulation were maintained, which led to inefficient use of economic potential.
The economies lost growth opportunities, which were present during the planning system, and new opportunities for the market system have not yet been properly formed. There was a sharp decline in production during the transition period in the 1990s, as GDP dropped 50-70 percent. At the initial stage of privatization, the new owners of enterprises were not ready to manage the market principles, strategic development planning and business activities, Thus, they directed their efforts to obtain "fast" profits from privatized property, which allowed to be enriched regardless of production efficiency. Economic success was largely result of a reorientation towards extractive industries, which led to excessive exploitation of natural resources and environmental pollution (Roaf, 2014: 10-28) .
It became imperative to re-establish labor, capital and product markets, to build new economic relations, to form consumer markets and to saturate its goods. In addition, the new order required new processes related to the life cycle of goods -from search for new suppliers of raw materials and replacement of obsolete equipment to search for new markets, and marketing strategies for promotion of goods and services.
It took time to move to efficient management, attracting investments, introducing new production and management technologies adequate to the markets. This transition is still not completed.
LIBERALIZATION
The transition to free market prices under a regime of higher demand than supply led to rapid inflation and, thus, low investment activity and export of savings (Njemcevic 2017: 15-22) . Also, problems associated with reduction of trade barriers still have to be solved. Imported goods dominate in high-tech and high-skilled product markets. Thus, the Eastern European economies have been even more dependent on traditional industries, like mining and manufacturing, when to buy modern consumption goods the countries run trade deficits, giving way to further export of capital. This has been fueled by foreign credits with high interest rates to consumers in order to buy foreign goods.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Legislative reform and institutional changes also played an important role for the failures of market economy implementation. The ill-conceived liberalization of the economy led to dominant shadow economies, with increase in crime and corruption. As result, the risks business increased. The legal system was not ready for the changes and necessary reforms have been hold back by agents benefiting from the mismatch (Turk, 2014: 199-208 ).
Hence, institutional shortcomings seem to be an important obstacle for economic growth and a fragile framework for integration, economic growth and financial and crisis management.
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT MATRIX
It is of importance to present the current institutional framework of the eleven Eastern European economies under investigation here in an orderly manner. Thus, an institutional development matrix is presented. This is made up of six categories: Sources, see footnote 1
Figure 4. Institutional development matrix for Eastern European economies
It is worth mentioning that the emerging economies continue to present a mixed picture. However, the very important parameters of gender equality, democracy and corruption perception score alarmingly badly. Sources, see footnote 1
Figure 5. Scores in the Institutional development indices.
The countries in our sample generally have their highest scores within state weakness, i.e the states are relatively strong, in human and economic freedom and human development. A democracy score of 0.19 puts Tajikistan as number 159 among 167 countries, when Bulgaria is the best achiever among the countries under investigation here, with a score of 0.70 The Corruption Perceptions Index gives Tajikistan a low score of 0.21, when Georgia is at the opposite side of the countries in the sample with a score of 0.56
To conclude, the above-presented analysis proved a statement concerning a great difference in the development inside the group of emerging economies, despite of similar initial conditions at the beginning of the independence of each country. Hence, there should be highlighted that countries-members of EU show better statistics. Thus, there is a significant need to analyze the financial crisis in the eleven Eastern European countries in order to find out if significant upturns and downturns were influenced by international, and in particular integration orientation. 
INTEGRATED INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INDEX
On the basis of these series it is possible to construct an integrated index of institutional development. In line with the methodology in the Human Development Index published by the United Nations, this paper offers a geometric approach. The departure can be explained by a general equation:
Here ⊓ is the geometric average of different parameters, a, numbered from i to n. In our case these parameters are taken from the structural development matrix: By applying these parameters in equation (4) one arrive at a more specified equation:
By setting in to this equation (5) one arrives at an integrated institutional development index. This shows that Georgia, Romania and Belarus had the highest level of development in this field, when Tajikistan clearly sits in the bottom. In sum, the institutional development in the eleven Eastern European countries under investigation seem fragile, meaning that modernization and the possibility of integration into a global economy is limited. Thus, these economies framework is not the best for meeting a financial crisis.
CYCLE ANALYSIS
By using the HP-filter in order to separate trend and cycle components one might be able to find out if financial stability indicators, such as money stock and credit volumes, could have paved way for the financial crisis. In other words, rapid increase in money and credits could have caused demand driven booms and overheating in the economy. This can be seen in positive deviations from trend, i.e. positive cycles.
By using World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, Eurostat and United Nation's data sorted and presented by the Federal Reserve bank of St Louis, one might be able to trace such developments (FRED, 2019). 2 We have been able to look at seven key macroeconomic indicators. First we look at productive measures as domestic product, manufacturing output and unemployment. How did these behave before and during the crises? Than we look at financial indicators money, credits, government debt and inflation. It would have been preferable to look at parameters such as asset prices and market interest rates. Arguably, the analysis may also have benefited from using quarterly data. One would also have preferred to include data starting at the fall of the iron curtain in 1991. However, lack of more detailed valid and reliable data with sufficient coverage and without too much noise basically limits the paper to use annual data for the period 1996-2017.
By using the HP-filter as described in equation (1) - (3) one is able to map cycles from trend according to equation ( is the residual. Thus, setting into the equations gives the following relationship:
In other words: cycles are found be deducting the smoothed parameters of gross domestic product, manufacturing output, unemployment, money stock, credit volumes, inflation and government debt from their respective observed series for every year in question. All the parameters, except unemployment and government debt is supposed to be pro-cyclical. i.e. the cycles expand in size during booms in front of the crisis and contact during the crises. As for unemployment and government debt, they should be counter-cyclical as they tend to contract in good times and expand in bad times.
The peak values of the cycles previous to the financial crisis for the seven parameters are reported in table 1 and the troughs or minimums in table 2 , where the numerics are presented as natural logarithms: GD = Government debt as percentages of gross domestic product in current prices, national currencies Also, p denotes peak moment during a boom, when t denotes trough, as the bottom of a burst or recession. In consequence of this overheating, the financial crisis hit hard. In Ukraine's and Armenia's annual GDP fell by 14.4 and 13.4 percent respectively, and 7.2 and 5.9 percent in Romania and Moldova. Manufacturing production contracted even more and unemployment increased.
APPLICATION
So what happened? After the transition crisis from communist to a market economies in the 1990s, most Western European economies gained momentum as they saw substantial economic growth prior to the crisis. This went on for almost a decade and lasted more or less until the Autumn of 2008. During this period of growth these emerging economies benefited from an underutilized real and human capital. Additionally, they took part in the international boom from the early 2000s.
Nevertheless, the growth was not sustainable. The countries ran huge current account deficits, and by that they developed increasingly high foreign debt along with dubious exchange rates for their currencies.
Belarus, Bulgaria and Ukraine had fixed rates of their currencies, which attracted massive inflows of short-term lending, giving fuel to monetary expansion, domestic loans and high inflation.
Foreign credit institutions were able to lend to Ukrainian consumers to interest rates of amazing 50 percent (Stroe 47-52). Thus, foreign exchange inflows accelerated imports and the balance of payments deficits rocketed. Due to very high inflation and balance of payments deficits it became impossible to maintain fixed exchange rates for currencies. Thus, they had to give up the policy and exchange rates fell drastically, paving way for imports of even more inflation and lack of trust of these economies (Åslund, 2010) .
During spring and summer 2008, it must have been evident that the economies of the region were overheated. These countries lack valid and reliable real estate price indices However, real estate prices were out of control due to high demand caused by monetary expansion and low supply. Wages had increased dramatically for skilled workers and the booming stock markets had begun to fall down.
The bank crises had been revealed in the US the early Autumn of 2008, banks didn't dare to renew their credits to other banks. Hence, domestic and international financial liquidity became extremely scarce. During a few weeks Eastern Europe saw rapid decline in international finance and a liquidity crisis evolved rapidly, soon revealing a solidity crisis in the private sector due to the high gearing with foreign and domestic capital. Along with the lack of liquidity and solidity, financial panic made capital flee the Eastern Europeans economies quite rapidly, and their currencies were sold for gold, dollars, euros, pounds and Swiss francs (Mihalijek 2010). Making the currencies to dive further, making these countries even more dubious means of foreign investment.
A fundamental problem for the crisis in Eastern Europe was excessive inflows of shortterm bank credits, enticed by fixed exchange rates. Hence, foreign private debt rocketed. Public finances, however, seemed to be under control, with an exception for Romania (and Hungary). However, public debt arised during the crisis due to reduced tax income and need for government support to reduce the impact of the financial downturn. (Dudas, 2013: 184-193 ).
To sum up, the present analysis confirms that the financial instability hypothesis contributes significantly to understand the financial crisis of the eleven emerging eastern European economies. Hence, the financial crisis of emerging Eastern European economies doesn't seem very different from traditional financial crises
CONCLUSIONS
The present paper seeks if it is relevant to explain the financial crisis of 2008-2010 in eleven emerging Eastern European economies with departure in the financial instability hypothesis as formulated by Minsky and Kindleberger. To do so it follows three key time series for the real economy and four for financial markets in these countries.
By using the Hodrick-Prescott filter as a structural time series analysis it has been possible to map cycles from trends in the series. The analysis reveal substantial overheating in the economy mirrored in huge expansion in financial and real economy indicators prior to the crisis, when the same variables contracted correspondingly during the crisis. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that loss of financial stability was an important element in the foreplay of the crisis.
By constructing an institutional development matrix and an integrated institutional development index, one finds that the economies under investigation did not have the necessary institutional strength to withstand the crisis.
